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Abstract 
10 years of successful co-operation between JRC and RF in the area of training in 
safeguards methodology and the development of accounting and monitoring systems has 
led to improved nuclear safeguards and security, that is a non-proliferation issue (i.e. the 
control on materials) and  a response to illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive 
material. 
While the US DoE Safeguards support focused on the removal and physical protection of 
weapon grade material, the EC strategy aimed at a sustainable development of a 
safeguards accountancy and control methodology with Nuclear Material (NM) 
measurements according to international standards and with internationally accepted 
reference materials.  
 
The EC-CIS relationship has evolved over the last 10 years from a demand-driven to a 
discussion-driven strategy in areas of mutual interest and benefit. The new program 
responds to a slightly shifted problem, away from the classical Nuclear Material 
Accountancy & Control (NMAC) towards combating of illicit trafficking while 
sustaining past initiatives within an enlarged international cooperation.  In particular, the 
three classical pillars in the area of NMAC will be combined into one, addressing the 
identified bottlenecks in the Soviet nuclear fuel cycle. A new second and third pillar will 
provide support in nuclear security issues and in environmental monitoring by focusing 
on the safeguards aspects of downblending NM and respectively by addressing the fight 
against illicit trafficking.  
Firstly, an enhanced surveillance for the accessibility of nuclear material undermines the 
chances for use of a nuclear device in terrorist attacks. Secondly, a further strengthening 
of the Nuclear Material Accountancy and Control will increase our protection against 
nuclear terrorist threats.  
In that view, future projects will be oriented taking into account the new situation where 
objectives will stick with international updated context. 
 
This paper presents the results of past collaboration and gives an overview of the JRC 
expertise which can be utilized in a new nuclear safeguards and security program.  
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1 – Introduction 
 
 Following the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the international community 
realized the importance of nuclear safety and security issues in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). The 1992 G7 summit in Munich decided to give the leadership 
to the European Union to address the corresponding problems. Upon request of the 
Member States the Commission created the TACIS (Technical Assistance to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States) program. 
In a first step, projects tackled the most urgent problems related to safety of Soviet-
Design Nuclear Power Plants. Feedbacks on the national situation and improved 
communication lead to point out major weaknesses in the system: 
• Independent regulatory authority was inexistent 
• The Nuclear Material Accountancy & Control (NMAC) didn’t match the 
international standards 
• There was no separation between civil and military cycles 
• Weapon grade material was dispatched between 4 members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). 
Consequently, in September 1994, the European Commission (EC) decided to include in 
the TACIS program projects for establishing more reliable safeguards systems. The 
decision was endorsed by the European Council, which requested the JRC to establish a 
coherent program for such a technical co-operation. 
 While the United States Safeguards support focused on the removal and physical 
protection of weapon grade material (1), the EC approach was based on the following 
three pillars for a sustainable improvement of nuclear safety and security (see fig 1): 
• Training on safeguards methodology 
• nuclear analytical capabilities serving for NMAC, nuclear forensics and reference 
material 
• development of instrumentation in co-operation with the RF industry. 
 
 One of the major missions of the Joint Research Center (JRC) is to provide 
support to other Commission Directorate General in particular for the present case to the 
External Relation, DG RELEX, and Europe Aid Co-operation Office, DG AidCo.  
The scientific support to the TACIS nuclear safety and security projects is based 
on: 
• The recognition of JRC as a centre of excellence 
• The institutes unique infrastructure and facilities deploying up-to-date 
techniques and state-of-the-art methodologies 
• The implementation of safeguards activities in a neutral way, i.e. independent 
from national or private interests 
• The long experience, support and collaboration with DG TREN for the 
implementation of the EURATOM treaty as well as the IAEA under the Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT).  
In particular, the JRC is well recognised by the international scientific community 
for: 
o the development of techniques, equipment and methodologies; 
o the on-site assistance; 
o the provision of training; 
o the evaluation and qualification of safeguards equipment. 
 
2 – TACIS Safeguards support program 1994 – 2004 
  
 In 1995, the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Minister of 
Nuclear Energy of the Russian Federation (RF), Mr. Mikhailov and the Commissioner 
Mr. van der Bröck in charge of External Relations was the starting point of the co-
operation. The RF introduced, based on the Federal Law on the Use of Nuclear Energy, 
enacted in November 1995, a new State System of accountancy and control (SSAC), 
which contains elements of International Safeguards and constitutes the basis for NMAC.  
The Joint Research Center (JRC), with a long-year experience in Safeguards R&D and 
with a Safeguards methodology that meets the international standards, was directly 
involved via a collaboration agreement signed by Mr. Egorov and Mr. Contzen. A first 
TACIS project on training in safeguards methodology started in December 1995 in 
Obninsk and was followed by other important milestones as the first Joint Steering 
Committee in 1996 or the Tripartite seminar in 1997. 
 
 Since 1994, 9 projects have been implemented in 3 beneficiary countries (Russian 
Federation, Kazakhstan, Ukraine) by two JRC Institutes: the Institute for Systems 
Information and Safety ISIS that was later renamed the Institute for the Protection and 
Security of the Citizen - IPSC- Ispra (Italy) and Institute for TransUranium Elements – 
ITU - Karlsruhe (Germany). 
 A summary of each project with its main focus is listed below:  
• Support to the creation of dedicated training centers for nuclear safeguards and 
Material Control and Accounting (MC&A): 
• Russian Methodological and Training Center (RMTC) in Obninsk, in 
collaboration with US DoE;  
• Ural Siberian Methodological and Training Center (UrSiMTC) in Snezhinsk; 
• Establishment of production strategy of instrumentation for the State System of 
Accountancy and Control (SSAC) of Nuclear Materials in Russia with VNIIA; 
• Design and set up of three laboratories at the Bochvar All Russian Institute of 
Inorganic Materials VNIIMN; 
• Pilot project on enhancement of the safeguards system at two nuclear power 
plants, Kursk and Kalinin; 
• Modernisation and enhancement of Nuclear Material Accountancy and Control 
(NMAC) at the Mayak RT-1 plant 
• Pilot project on combating illicit trafficking of nuclear materials with the Institute 
for Nuclear Research in Kiev. 
• Enhancement of facilities Mass/Volume, Containment/Surveillance and Training 
at Ulba Metallurgical Plant (UMP); 
• Enhancement of safeguards at the Ulba fabrication plant, the Almaty VVER 
reactor and the Kurchatov reactor in Kazakhstan. 
Fig. 1 Overview of the EC strategy with the three pillars for the past projects and the 
three pillars for the new projects. 
 
The 10 years of successful cooperation has been celebrated by the involved EC and RF 
representatives, in presence of a US DoE National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA) delegation and press (2,3).  
 
 
3 - Current Situation and Needs 
 
3.1 Russian Federation 
 
RF situation on NMA&C in ’04: Safeguards NMAC with
physical protection enhanced by Germany in addition to the US
safeguards methodology fixed in legislation
safeguards measurements with international instruments
Sustainability of the established training centres
Assistance in safeguards aspects of excess NM
Multi-country collaboration for efficient fighting against Illicit Trafficking of
Nuclear Material and Radioactive Material
Strengthening of the security/safeguards authority complementary to other programmes(**)
Re-evaluation from EC point of view
Re-oriented needs
Co-operation EC – CIS (where appropriate in collaboration with US/DoE) :
International network on NMAC methods/instruments/standards, also for future facilities
Enhancement of control for entry of excess downblended WG NM in civil fuel cycle
Nuclear forensics and methodological measures for illicit trafficking of nuclear material
and radioactive material
Support to regulatory body (Gosatomnazdor) for centralised State System for NMAC
TACIS objective
System Analysis projects:
Onsite interim storage of SFA in RBMK: find
solutions for bottle neck 1
Andreev Bay submarines + Murmansk ice
breakers (SevRAO + MSCO): find solutions
for bottle neck 2
Modern sealing devices (with use of UrSiMTC)
(VNIIA+VNIITF)
NRTA at the new MOX fuel fabrication plant
reactor NMAC model replication(REA+Ukraine)
‘05: Disciplines:
3 pilars: NMAC network withStudy of NMAC for
spent fuel & waste
storage
Illicit Trafficking of
NM and RM:
nuclear forensics
methodology
integration &
collaboration with
security authority
Reoriented basic lines
Methodological projects:
Further development of nuclear
forensics database
Training of security responsibles
for detection/declaration of illicit
trafficking cases
Assistance for efficient control
of NM at different types of
nuclear facilities
Techn. assist: entry excess WG
NM in civil fuel cyclee.g. set-up of
info barriers for control detectors
2004 and beyond
Entry of excess WG
NM in civil fuel cycle
initiative    :control of
downblended WGNM
in new MOX plant)
(***) Ref: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2004/ebsp2004n004.html
’91: Collapse of Soviet Union:
nuclear weapons in hands of 4 new independent republics: RF, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus
’92: RF situation on NMAC based on:
Military and Intelligence:        0
Physical protection:                 -
Production control/ QA:          +
Introduce new approach to NMAC for safeguards purposes
according to Euratom/ IAEA standards:
criteria more stringent than for production control/ QA
compatible control of NM with international standards
national legislation
background
needs
Support/ technological assistance for CIS
safeguards accountancy & control methodology
NM measurements according to international levels
with internationally accepted reference materials standards
TACIS objective
‘94-’95: Discipline oriented projects:
3 pilars:
Results:
‘96-’97: System analysis projects
Master plan with an overview on the need
for instruments in co-operation with CEA:
    +
Legislation development in co-operation
with the Euratom Safeguards Department
               +
Synthesis Study for identification of bottle
necks in the RF nuclear fuelcycle:
                      2(*)
Safeguards aspects for the entry of excess
WG NM in civil cycle (sealing)
   -
‘96-‘03: Projects: prototype implementations
Analytical lab for Illicit Trafficking:
Kiev (Ukraine )
                          +
Fuel Fabrication plant: Ulba (Kazakhstan)
Multi-tank Scanning for NMAC
   1st  phase completion foreseen ’04
Reactors: Kursk (RBMK), Kalinin (WWER)
establish NMAC model for Rosenergoatom
                           ongoing
Reprocessing plant: Mayak: NMAC
enhancement
             Initiated in ‘04
EC approach US approach
Removal of WG NM from Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, Belarus (back to RF/ US)
Development of instrumenta-
tion  in co-operation with RF
industry
VNIIA: equipment: +
Chemical/analytical refe-
rence materials standards &
characterisation
VNIIMN: Data base: +
Application type
Basic lines
ISTC:
Generalisation type
(*)  Bottle Neck 1: What to do with the SFA of the RBMK interim stored onsite ?
Bottle Neck 2: How to access (controlled) the fuel of submarines (Andreev Bay) and icebreakers (Murmansk) ?
History 1994-2004
Training safeguards
methodology
IPPE: RMTC: ++
VNIITF: UrSiMTC: -
assist in the safeguards aspects of excess NM: barrier
between military & civilian cycle
(***)
Preservation of knowledge by supporting young trainees
Surveillance/remote
verification (AP)
RF, Ukraine and Kazakhstan signed the AP but the AP is not yet in force
NRTA extension at Mayak/ Ulba
Testing lab for instrumentation certification
EC STRATEGY for Technical Assistance and Support to CIS countries in nuclear safeguards *
no distinction between civilian and military fuel cycle
Enhance physical protection in CIS
Enhance NMAC in many CIS facilities
cover the largest possible number of
facilities and R&D infrastructure
TOMSK project
Kazakhstan project
support CIS scientists  by e.g.
(*) Similar projects exist under the PHARE programme for technical support to neighbouring accession countries
TEMPEST: certification: 0
(**) Ref: Nuclear Safety Indicative Programme 2004-2006 Including ISTC-STCU, adopted by EC on 7.11.03
Mtons to MWatt
aspects: entry of WG
NM in civil fuel cycle:
demonstration/training
Sustain cooperation in
instrument/methodology
development               .
 President Putin has recently restructured the Federal Government and this affected 
as well the nuclear government bodies Minatom (today FAEA: Federal Atomic Energy 
Agency) and the newly created Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Oversight 
Service (which incorporates former Gozatomnadzor).  
 Some prospective studies by RAS Institute of Power Research pointed out a 
possible a strong increase of the nuclear power production. This has implications on the 
whole fuel cycle in the RF and the CIS, especially in fuel assembly fabrication (standard 
and MOX option) and reprocessing (cf. RF decree on the possibility to reprocess foreign 
fuel elements, completion of the RT-1 plant reconstruction, enlargement of Spent Nuclear 
Fuel (SNF) storage facilities at the RT-2 plant). Moreover, very important plans are under 
discussion in the RF, in particular about the disposal and/or re-utilization of nuclear 
material flows from military accountancy (front-end of weapons-grade plutonium 
utilization in Russian reactors and reprocessing of spent fuels from naval nuclear 
propulsion).  The Safeguards system will have to be upgraded accordingly.  
 General Safeguards aspects will be extended to the fight against illicit trafficking 
of nuclear and radioactive materials, following detected past cases and new terrorist 
threats after the tragic events of September 11, 2001 and March 11, 2003. JRC had a 
pioneering experience in the field as the EC illicit trafficking combat program started in 
the mid-nineties and was jointly developed with IAEA.  
 
3.2 Ukraine 
 
 Ukraine inherited most of the Soviet Union’s NM. As a consequence, the EU’s 
co-operation objectives as set out in the PCA (Partnership and Co-operation Agreement) 
with Ukraine focussed also on the establishment of a NMAC based on international 
EURATOM and IAEA standards. 
Because of its infrastructures (ports, pipeline networks) and strategic geographical 
position, Ukraine has an important role as a transit route with EU countries. Moreover, 
after the enlargement it has a long border with the EU. The EU has therefore a particular 
interest in combating illicit trafficking in the frame of a multi-country co-operation 
project in order to protect the new outer border of enlarged Europe.  
 
3.3 Kazakhstan 
 
 Kazakhstan which inherited Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction (NWMD) of 
the former Soviet Union on the one hand and the contaminated Semipalatinsk nuclear 
weapon test site on the other hand had to undergo an important transition phase towards 
Non Nuclear Weapon State with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in force and the 
Additional Protocol (AP) signed. Kazakhstan transferred all nuclear warheads to Russia 
by April 1995 and destroyed the nuclear testing infrastructure at Semipalatinsk by July 
2000. 
 The ULBA nuclear fuel conversion and fabrication plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk is 
one of the largest in the world and includes two separate facilities one for production of 
RBMK fuel pellets and one for production of pellets for WWER 1000.  
 Beside Ulba, Kazakhstan is housing also the NNC reactors (3 research reactors at 
Kurchatov and Alatau) and the Mangyschalk fast breeder reactor (at Aktau and which is 
now permanently closed down). 
This important fuel cycle, and the related international transports (UMP is providing fuel 
pellets for WWER which are processed by Electrostahl, near Moscow, for the fabrication 
of Fuel Assemblies) calls upon the strengthening of Safeguards.  
 Moreover, several cases of Nuclear Materials and several tenths of cases of 
Radioactive Materials Illicit Trafficking (IT) have been detected leading to a very high 
concern for IT risks. This issue will be addressed in the context of a multi-country 
project. 
 
3.4 Multi-country approach 
 
 The safe operation of nuclear facilities, have been efficiently solved at many 
important nuclear facilities with the large support of nuclear industry. The 9 projects of 
the JRC, the large US support in Safeguards and some additional support of Member 
States have considerably enhanced the situation. The international community recognises 
the current need for strengthening nuclear security, a general international problem. A 
corresponding multi-country project is proposed to combat illicit trafficking with 7 
different countries, RF, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Moldavia and Belarus.  
 
4 – TACIS Safeguards support program 2005 -2008 
 
 The new programme proposal is larger in terms of budget as well as geographic 
distribution.  Although it completes previous projects, reinforces and sustains past 
activities it mainly addresses new challenges with the same objectives: the dissemination 
of a safety culture, by the transfer of know-how and knowledge and the enforcement of 
the nuclear security. 
 15 projects within the 7 a.m. countries will still be implemented by the two 
institutes, IPSC and ITU.  
 The new series of projects continues dealing with safeguards issues, tracking the 
nuclear material by improving the NMAC of fuel cycle to avoid diversion and possible 
dissemination. But as mentioned before, it also addresses new challenges in particular 
with the situation in Northwest Russia where nuclear spent fuels from submarines and 
icebreakers are waiting to be evacuated. 
 These projects are listed below: 
• Improvement of accountancy and control of hold-up and waste in RT-1 plant 
at Mayak; 
• Establishment of testing laboratory at VNIIA for certification of NMAC 
instruments; 
• Development and introduction of modern sealing devices at Minatom’s 
enterprises; 
• Analytical and metrological support on NMAC; 
• Nuclear material accountancy and control (NMAC) applied to naval spent fuel 
in North West Russia; 
• Implementation of measures to combat illicit trafficking of radioactive and 
nuclear material – Multi-country project dedicated to Russian Federation, 
Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Republic of Kazakhstan; 
• Containment/Surveillance system for RBMK spent fuel storage on Kursk NPP; 
• Ukrainian border crossing station (Measures of fight against illicit trafficking of 
nuclear and radioactive material); 
• Armenian border crossing station (Measures of fight against illicit trafficking of 
nuclear and radioactive material); 
• Adaptation and commissioning of a computerized NMA system in Armenian 
NPP Medzamor; 
• Enhancing the capability for analysis of seized nuclear materials and 
radioactive substances by the main expert organization of Ukraine; 
• Enhancing the capability for analysis of seized nuclear materials and 
radioactive substances by the main expert organization of Kazakhstan; 
• Automated data analysis and interpretation for Near Real Time Accountancy 
at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant; 
• Sustainability of UrSiMRC. 
 In both cases, for past and new projects, enhancement of safety and security is 
achieved by delivery of equipment, obviously, but also training in safeguards 
methodology and techniques and specific support for NMAC and fight against Illicit 
Trafficking. 
  
5 – JRC capabilities in nuclear security 
 
 The geopolitical situation brought more attention to security aspects, including in 
the nuclear field. New threats by terrorist groups that may utilise nuclear or radioactive 
material for so-called dirty bombs urge enhanced control measures. According to 
Rumyantsev cited in Nature, “it is impossible to completely that no terrorist has any 
access to fissile material or nuclear industry allowing the production of nuclear 
weapons”. 
 Traditional safeguards activities supported by the JRC are being confirmed and 
extended in the proposal for the next framework programme 2007 – 2011. In particular, 
R&D in automated and portable Destructive and Non-Destructive Assay (DA and NDA) 
techniques to support safeguards inspections will continue. New systems of Containment 
and Surveillance (C/S) will be investigated and classical Mass and Volume (M/V) 
measurement techniques will evolve to an integrated system dedicated to Near Real Time 
Accountancy (NRTA) to enhance the first line of defence, i.e. detection of nuclear 
material diversion. Finally, combating illicit trafficking and nuclear forensics will 
continue and evolve, taking into account the risk associated with radioactive sources and 
deploying detection systems to the outside borders of future enlarged Europe. 
 Complementary, with the aim to support Commission services and to collaborate 
with IAEA and Member States authorities, the JRC will continue to systematically collect 
and analyse information from a variety of sources on nuclear non-proliferation issues 
(possibly extending into other WMD and delivery systems). This information will be 
used to produce country reports where the evolution of nuclear activities and of import 
and/or export of nuclear direct and dual use equipment and technology in selected 
countries will be closely followed. The information from these open sources will be 
corroborated with satellite imagery and other powerful tools as container traffic 
monitoring. To underpin this work, JRC will further develop multilingual web search, 
knowledge management and data mining technologies. 
 
6 – Conclusion 
 
 The JRC involvement in the safeguards area is confirmed for the near future and 
commitment to pursue TACIS support program is illustrated by the on-going approval of 
proposed series of projects with an increased budget.  
 Past and future activities are dealing with traditional safeguards issues and 
prospective studies are being conducted to adapt and enlarge activities in a more global 
security approach. Evolving from a demand-driven to discussion-driven relationship with 
our CIS partners, a clear strategic paper on NMAC issues, with a clear vision of goals and 
corresponding needs has to be issued to anticipate and orient the next support program. 
 Safeguards activities will be extended to security with a possible application of 
the recognised safeguards systems to materials used in other weapons of mass 
destruction. 
 Finally, the JRC will seek to co-ordinate its efforts with other ongoing 
international activities (ISTC, USDoE, support of the Donor’s States, etc…). To avoid 
duplication with other international projects in the CIS, a new tripartite meeting with EC-
RF-US is planned.  
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